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The desire to create a more competitive, market based transport system has led
to the involvement of the private sector in infrastructure investments. However,
there are still distinct aspects that often make investment in transport
infrastructure unattractive to private parties. This paper elucidates the
characteristics of investments in infrastructure in general, with the aim to
clarify the hesitation of private investors. One specific category of infrastructure
investments, viz. container terminals, is discussed here as an interesting case.
European container terminals are mostly financed with a strong involvement of
private parties. From a comparative study between investments in container
terminals and other investments in infrastructure, we argue that the terminal
market has several features (such as imperfect competition), which lead to a
lower risk for private parties. Because of these characteristics, public-private
partnerships occur rather often and seem to be attractive. A situation of a fully
competitive terminal market without government intervention is in the long-run
possible and clearly more realistic than in other infrastructure markets. It
should be realised however, that a common European policy is required to avoid
distortion of competition among ports due to different subsidy regimes.
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INTRODUCTION
Transportation lies at the heart of the spatial-economic evolution of our
economies. A well-functioning transport network is an important condition for
the competitive position of regions and cities. Today, the most prosperous
locations are found where transport nodes coincide with skilled labour markets
and a high quality environment. This has encouraged some countries to take a
more pro-active approach towards transport planning, with investment preceding
rather than following demand. Seen from this perspective, infrastructure plays a
fundamental role in the development of regions, and investments in infrastructure
are for many (local) governments a critical element of their policy. In a European
context, investments in transport infrastructure are usually regarded as a major
incentive for economic development, especially when one looks at the Trans
European Network (TEN) plans.
In Europe, the traditional approach to transport infrastructure has been based
on detailed government intervention, ostensibly to protect and promote the public
interest. In the case of infrastructure, direct state provision has been the norm
(including financing). However, in recent years profound changes in economic
and spatial policy have brought about a re-orientation so that the dominant role of
the public sector is increasingly questioned. Especially in port financing,
experience and research strongly suggest that privatisation has been effective
for enhancing efficiencies and lowering costs, provided there is a competitive
environment (Kent and Ashar, 2001). The trend towards market principles and
liberalist views sketched by Fukuyama (1992), and mirrored amongst others in
devolution principles such as deregulation, decentralisation and privatisation, has
far reaching implications for public sector involvement in physical planning
including infrastructure planning. These policy changes have profound implica-
tions for financing European infrastructure (Henry, 1993). This trend is reinforced
by developments such as public budget deficits in many countries and the need
for more competition in the provision of (semi) public goods, in order to enhance
efficiency.
These developments have often led to the desire to create a more
competitive, market based transport sector in which the government does
not need to finance all investments in infrastructure. So far, private
financing of transport infrastructure has been most significant in Latin
America and the Caribbean region and in East Asia (World Bank, 1996). The
present paper pays particular attention to the problems and possibilities in
private financing. After outlining some of the characteristics and risks of
private investment in infrastructure, the focus will be on a particular kind of
infrastructure; namely container terminals at (sea-)ports. Private involvement
in financing and operating container terminals in ports is said to be high
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compared with other investments in European transport infrastructure such
as roads and railways (see eg Farrell, 1999). The aim of the present paper is
to elucidate on this theme and to identify particular issues that demonstrate
why terminals are likely to be attractive for private investors, based on a
comparative study.
THE NATURE OF INVESTMENTS IN INFRASTRUCTURE
Infrastructure is a broad concept; several definitions and descriptions have been
used in the literature. Recently, a study on the meaning and content of this term
has been carried out by Nijkamp et al. (2000). According to this study,
infrastructure includes those real estate provisions which increase efficiency in
the use of factors of production and meet the following requirements:
infrastructure is directly productive, is characterised by stock features (capital
good) and it has the character of a (semi-) public good (in this respect non-
excludability and non-rivalry in consumption are often cited as characteristics of a
public good). According to the Nijkamp et al. study, three categories of
infrastructure can be distinguished. Physical network infrastructure includes
elements such as transport infrastructure and public utilities, water management
and industrial sites. Immaterial knowledge infrastructure and environmental
infrastructure are the two other categories.
Traditional welfare theory argues that social welfare can be maximised
through market transactions based on free exchange in perfectly competitive
markets. In this ideal economy, government intervention would negatively
affect the Pareto-optimal outcome. However, following the above-mentioned
description, the market for infrastructure is far from being considered as
perfectly competitive. Market imperfections exist in the form of, for instance,
externalities, which make governmental intervention necessary in this sector.
The aim of the government is then to remedy this sub-optimal allocation and
in this way to move towards the theoretically pure situation of perfect
competition.
In recent years however, it has become understood that, mainly due to
government failures, financing of all types of infrastructure by governments is not
an appropriate solution, and certainly not in a situation of high public sector
deficits. These failures of government agencies lead often to problematic cost
estimates and in several cases to inefficient spending of public money. On the
other hand, it is overly optimistic to think that these failures will completely
disappear with private financing of infrastructure investments. However, from a
financial point of view, private involvement is attractive, for attention is focused
on economic and commercial value.
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Options for private finance in transport
Private financing of construction is usually associated with continuing public
sector responsibility for strategic network and locational planning. In the case of
toll roads and urban mass transit infrastructure, private firms are normally given a
concession to manage and operate the facility for a certain period, with ownership
of the asset returning at some point in time to the public sector. There are several
ways in which the private sector can contribute to the development of the
transport system (ITS, 1999). For example, the private sector can be involved
directly in financing new investment, as is the case in many rail projects, with the
operator of the infrastructure repaying the loan. This introduces the issue of the
impact of private sector objectives, emphasising the financial return on
investment in the specific measures covered. Another possibility is that the
private sector can be involved in the operation (and possibly also in the financing)
of the infrastructure, deriving its revenue from the user. This leads to the
imposition of user charges through fares and parking or road use charges. These
are usually determined in order to maximise revenue, and this can significantly
affect the outcome of the overall strategy.
The private sector usually seeks commercial profit either through return on
investment, or as value captured through improvements in the transport system.
Despite the higher costs of capital raised from commercial sources and the need to
cover risks and achieve profitability, it has often been argued that the overall cost
to society could be lower with private financing, than if the government were to
provide the facilities through tax proceeds. The following objectives of private
financing can be identified (ITS, 1999):
. Minimisation of the impact of additional taxation, debt burden or financial
guarantees;
. Introduction of the benefits of private sector management and control
techniques in the construction and operational phases of projects (possibly
leading to lower costs);
. Promotion of private entrepreneurial initiative and innovation in infrastruc-
ture projects; and
. Increase in the financial resources that might be available for the projects.
In container terminal investments, especially the second and fourth objectives for
involvement of private container terminal operators apply. Private finance can be
said to be only purely private, if (ITS, 1999):
. The private party runs all risks;
. The investment is paid directly by its users; and
. The operation is based upon user charges.
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In practice, transport infrastructure rarely fulfils these requirements. Almost all
European transport infrastructure (except for the Channel tunnel and toll roads in
France, Italy and Spain) has been financed and operated by governments or by
public bodies linked to the government.
Characteristics of investments in infrastructure
Investments in infrastructure have some special features. Broadly speaking one
can identify seven characteristics of investments in infrastructure (ECMT, 1990).
Firstly, the expectation of the economic life of infrastructure is very long. This may
range from 20 years to more than a century. The pay-back period of infrastructure
investments is also long; usually around 15 to 30 years. The pay-back period for
normal capital goods is generally much shorter, the average being eight to nine
years.
Secondly, during the construction time, a large amount of capital is required.
Often high loans have to be acquired, which makes interest costs relatively high.
The costs are also influenced by the project financier; the government is usually
able to attract loans which are cheaper (ie lower interest rates) than the private
sector.
Another feature of infrastructure investments is that the waiting period prior to
actual infrastructure construction can be very long. This has to do with the many
legal decision-making procedures, resistance by society and interest groups, and
other time consuming formalities. These formalities often lead to project changes
that can have a major influence on project costs. During this planning process,
different unforeseen events may thus happen which are of critical influence on the
whole project and may even lead to planning disasters (see Hall, 1990).
A fourth characteristic is the irreversibility of the investment once the project
has started. If construction is discontinued, this would lead to a significant capital
loss, because it is not possible to use the investment in another way. From the
investor’s point of view, the irreversibility of investment is a fundamental obstacle
which increases the threshold of the minimum rate of return required.
The next feature of infrastructure investment is the long construction period.
This period may take two to seven years depending on the scale of the project.
During this period there are no revenues, but there are of course already interest
and other costs.
Another characteristic is the uniqueness of each infrastructure project. Each
infrastructure project is different from another. This fact is likely to have an
influence on cost estimates due to lack of experience, low learning possibilities
and lack of comparability.
A final characteristic in many cases is the relatively low level of operational
(variable) costs, especially on longer distance infrastructure. There are some
overhead, maintenance and labour costs, but compared to the construction costs
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of infrastructure or the exploitation costs of other investments, these costs are
relatively low. In such cases (high fixed costs and low variable costs), setting
prices according to marginal costs (which is economically optimal) does not allow
a satisfactory return on investment and this, in general, makes infrastructure
investments unattractive to the private investor.
Figure 1 exemplifies this case (for simplicity, average variable and marginal
costs are considered constant, which is a plausible assumption as long as capacity
is sufficient). At traffic level q, optimum price for the investor should be p1 (this
corresponds to the point where marginal revenue is equal to marginal cost). Total
revenue is given by the area 0qAp1 and total cost by 0qBp2. A loss of p1p2BA is
incurred at this level of traffic and, as a matter of fact, there is no price at which
the project is profitable (average total cost curve always above demand line). It is
now possible to operate the infrastructure project at a profit, only if external funds
are available (government or other interested parties). Such funds would help
lowering the investor’s ATC curve below A, thus enabling him to realise a profit.
The above characteristics show that high financial capital outlays are
required at the outset of a project and, apparently, the many risks involved are
equally significant.
Risks in infrastructure investments
The major issue in involving private finance for transport infrastructure
investments concerns the sharing of risk. As noted above, in such investments,
p2
p1
Figure 1: Market situation for an investor in infrastructure
Source: Nijkamp and Rienstra (1995)
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the flow of revenues often begins many years after the initial investment; this
increases uncertainty (and thus risk) compared to alternative investment options.
Investments in infrastructure can entail a multitude of risks. The following
categories can be distinguished (Nijkamp and Rienstra, 1995):
. political risks: for example, changes in transport policy or regulations by the
government;
. financial risks: fluctuations in interest rates and exchange rates; wrong
expectations about inflation;
. construction risks: delays; unexpected and unpredictable costs;
. operational risks: damage by accidents and vandalism; and
. commercial risks: wrong cost estimates or wrong estimates of traffic volume.
All these risks make it difficult to draw up a reliable cost and demand estimation;
each risk has its own distinct influence on these variables. A policy shift, for
instance, may lead to the construction of a road tunnel to protect a natural area,
whereas at the outset of the project the road was planned to cross the area. This
leads, of course, to higher costs that could have never been estimated at the start
of the project. A clear example of a commercial risk is that of the O¨resund bridge
between Sweden and Denmark where traffic was highly overestimated leading to
disappointing toll revenues.
In conclusion, the risks of infrastructure investments are comparatively high
and, thus, private sector interest commensurately low. Clearly, the public sector
has a role to play here by making investments more attractive. This could be
done, for instance, by means of joint-risk arrangements (guaranteeing a public
subsidy if the use of infrastructure is below expectations), or by guaranteeing a
minimum profit ratio.
Interestingly, however, some types of infrastructure, such as telecommunica-
tions and seaports, seem to be more appealing to the private sector. Seaports are
discussed in more detail in what follows.
CONTAINER TERMINAL INVESTMENT: EUROPEAN STATE OF THE ART
Port investment in general
Containerisation has led to the construction of increasingly larger vessels, while
market structure in liner shipping has resulted in the formation of alliances of
container carriers. These developments have forced port authorities and container
terminal operators to increase their scale too. The location of an individual port is
nowadays becoming less important compared to its ability to offer services and
hinterland connections that fit into the alliance networks (see also van Klink,
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1995). Networking – rather than location – seems the key to future growth of
ports. Furthermore, volumes per alliance are enormous and this will probably
result in more dedicated container terminals or, in the medium-term, maybe even
in dedicated container networks.
Despite the wide variety of approaches to financing port facilities and
services, however, there is a discernible current trend towards greater private
sector participation in port activities, particularly those of a predominantly
commercial nature such as cargo handling (EC, 1997). Ports are rapidly becoming
a normal industry through the injection of private money that ensures greater
competition, higher productivity and probably lower costs. In Europe, the UK is at
the forefront of these developments. Recently, mainland Europe is catching up as
governments loosen their grip on ports and container terminals. Ports are
becoming landlords and lease container facilities to private companies. Even port
authorities are linking up and more consolidation is to follow with the UK and
Germany leading the way. So far, the benefits of private involvement in ports are
strictly limited to container terminals. Until very recently, political interference
and the structure of port management had not changed to meet the new
circumstances. EU research has shown that financing of ports and maritime
infrastructure in Europe and policies on charging their users vary considerably,
reflecting the differences in the way in which their ownership and organisation
has been approached (EC, 1997). EU policy aims at transparency in financing and
charging (fair and efficient) of port users without distorting competition, but such
policies are bound to have a limited impact as the Commission cannot control
public financing of infrastructure.
Figure 2 depicts the actors and their relations with respect to investment in
container terminals, in general. In Northern European landlord ports, the most
common financial structure is one in which the government pays for access to the
port by land and sea, an (autonomous) port authority funds infrastructure such as
land reclamation and quay walls, and private container terminal operators fund
the suprastructure: paving, buildings and mechanical equipment. Infrastructure
costs are recovered to a greater or lesser extent through charges on ships and
cargo, and rental and leasing payments from the container-handling companies.
However, there remain large differences in the level of public sector financial
support, which are passed on into port tariffs (Farrell, 1999). In Southern Europe,
port authorities and/or the state were until recently responsible for almost all port
investment, including mechanical equipment and superstructure as well as
infrastructure. This was the result of vertical integration (Greece), strength of
unions (Italy), the weak financial position of the private stevedores (Spain) or the
treatment of ports as public service organisations (France). However, the reforms
of the early 1990s and the move towards landlord ports have resulted in a gradual
convergence of financial structures in Northern and Southern Europe.
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It appears that private involvement in financing container terminals in ports is
high compared to other investments in transport infrastructure such as roads and
railways. A possible explanation for the ‘demand’ of private investments by the
government is that container terminal operations are too complex for cities and
regions; another explanation of private involvement may be found in the
increasing efficiency of privately run terminals. A third reason may have to do
with the increasing scale of container terminals and, finally, a part of the picture
may be provided by the fact that operating container terminals is no longer
Figure 2: An overview of central actors and relations in container terminal investment
Source: based on Wiegmans et al. (1998)
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considered as a core business of governments. Reasons for governments to be still
involved in container terminal development are to be found in the creation of
employment and also the fact that ensuring sufficient provision of infrastructure is
sometimes still considered as government core business. However, the main
reason may be port competition. Almost all container terminals in Europe are
subsidised which means that a new terminal will almost certainly have to be
subsidised too, if it is to compete with existing terminals.
Container terminal infrastructure investments
Container terminals form a central part of the transport infrastructure for freight
transport. A terminal is a place where containers are transferred among transport
modes and is thus located at modal transfer points such as ports (see also
Wiegmans et al., 1999). In the terminal market, there are two important groups
striving for quality: owners and operators:
1. Terminal owners not providing services themselves (investors). Basically,
there are three forms of terminal ownership: private, public, or a public/
private partnership. It is especially the latter form of ownership that can
further complicate daily operations, due to actors often having conflicting
interests; and
2. Terminal operators who provide the terminal service assortment. Terminal
operations can be carried out by a wide variety of economic agents such as an
independent terminal operator, railway company, seaport company, shipping
line, multimodal transport company/forwarder, the road haulage industry,
and/or even a city. Also, a consortium of more than one economic agents may
be formed to run a terminal.
Table 1 distinguishes various alternatives of marine container terminal develop-
ment. A container terminal can basically be developed in three ways: a new
container terminal can be developed on a greenfield site, an existing container
terminal can be extended, and an industrial site can be redeveloped into a
container terminal. Four main categories of terminal investments can be
envisaged (see Table 1):
1. Infrastructure investments consist of investments in rail, road, barge and sea
facilities to the terminal (terminal external);
2. Terminal superstructure investments consist of specific investments (eg quays
and crane rails) in terminal infrastructure (terminal internal);
3. Investments in the terminal suprastructure are investments on the terminal
site that are not specific for a container terminal (eg terminal buildings,
pavements, lighting, etc.); and
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4. IT structure investments are all information technology investments needed
for the container terminal.
Especially the information technology is seen as the battleground of this decade
among not just carriers, but also forwarders, logistics based integrators, pure
technology companies, and maybe terminal operators (Peters, 2001).
Investments in container terminals: characteristics and risks
According to Farrell (1999) there are several reasons why ports have been more
successful than other modes of transport in attracting private capital. This holds
true especially for investments in container terminals.
. In most European countries, substantial public resources have gone into port
infrastructure development, allowing service providers to make healthy
profits at prices that are perceived as reasonable by their customers. The
assignment of infrastructure to terminal operators in large blocks – which is
quite unlike the ‘open access’ stevedoring arrangements found in some other
parts of the world – has restricted competition from new entrants and
protected monopoly profits (an opposite position is faced by the railways).
Overall, in most container ports, there is only one container terminal
operator, which suggests the existence of regional monopolies.
. The second reason for private sector interest in container terminals is the
labour productivity gains in recent years, and the steady fall in unit costs due
to economies of scale, which have not always been passed on to container
terminal (port) users through lower tariffs. Private operators taking over the
management of a public facility have usually been able to improve on past
profit levels through the introduction of more flexible labour practices. The
limited supply of terminals suitable for leasing and the high costs of building
new infrastructure allow these profit levels to be maintained.
. Furthermore, most container terminals involve relatively low risks after
government intervention. The amounts of private investment required are
still relatively small in comparison with other transport modes. Most of the
Table 1: Container terminal development and investment categories
New CT Extension of CT Redevelopment
Infrastructure X X x
Terminal superstructure X X X
Suprastructure X X X
IT structure X X x
X=high importance in financial terms, x=average importance in financial terms.
Source: Wiegmans et al. (1999)
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assets are mobile, with well-developed second hand markets. Private
investment in container terminals is therefore not such a leap in the dark
as it is in other transport modes.
The main issues in involving private finance for transport infrastructure
investments in Europe – through long leasing contracts and operational
involvement – concern risk sharing, higher efficiency, and infrastructure
competition. The degree of risk sharing depends on the lease contract, but some
general statements on the various risk components can be made.
In general, the government ‘controls’ the political risk of all characteristics of
the investment in a container terminal. The terminal operator is ‘safeguarded’
from this risk by the government. The financial risks are shared between the
government and the private terminal operator through lease agreements. The
governmental body mainly carries the construction risks of the container
terminal. The private terminal operator runs both the operational risk and the
commercial risk. Besides reducing the risks mentioned above for private container
terminal operators, there are beneficial aspects for both parties that might explain
the higher level of occurrence of public-private cooperation in ports:
. With the construction of a new container terminal a city expects to receive
more seaport tariffs and an increase in employment. These (financial)
benefits are extra benefits above the amount resulting from the lease of the
terminal facilities;
. In general, a container terminal has to compete with container terminals in
other harbours for trans-shipment volume (inter-port competition). This leads
to a convergence of interest between the private container terminal operators
and their respective port authorities, united by their efforts to compete against
other container ports. In the case of road and rail investment, such an
identification of public (regional) interest and private interest is less probable.
THE RELATION BETWEEN RISKS, PROFITS, AND PUBLIC PRIVATE
PARTNERSHIPS
European container terminals are normally operated on a common-user basis, and
have different characteristics (Farrell, 1999). They have been transferred to the
private sector as leasehold concessions rather than privately built installations.
Their main customers are shipping lines rather than tramps, making them more
responsive to quality of service than to price. Since container lines have a greater
choice of ports than bulk shippers and are more mobile, one often observes fierce
inter-port competition.
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Lately, we have seen the development of the first dedicated container terminals in
Europe (eg P&O in Antwerp and Euromax in Rotterdam). Due to the increasing
scale of container carriers and the continuing development of liner shipping
alliances, volume seems sufficient to justify dedicated terminals providing just the
services as they are needed (see also Benacchio et al., 2000). The problem remains
though that public ports bear the risks of new investment, and these risks are
often underestimated by public port officials. As a result, ports may fail to choose
the best investment or the best development strategy (Luberoff and Walder,
2000). This can be countered through true project-based financing (shifts risk
from public to private parties and improves decision making on investments in
intermodal facilities). Also the new proposed regulation by the EU suggests a
changing attitude in Europe towards ports (Commission of the European
Communities, 2001). The trend towards more private involvement is acknow-
ledged and will be facilitated in the near future.
Figure 3 presents a short-term investment situation where, under certain
assumptions, it is profitable for a private company to invest in a terminal on the
basis of a public-private partnership. As a consequence, investment costs are
reduced (for the private party) through suitable lease contracts. This results in a
lower average total cost curve, which is now below the average revenue curve.
Marginal costs are not considered constant anymore. Price will be set at p1 and the
p2
p1
Figure 3: Market situation for an investor in terminals
Source: Nijkamp and Rienstra (1995), adapted
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terminal operator will make a profit of p1p2BA (assuming, for the sake of
simplicity, that no price discrimination takes place). In practice, however, prices
are subject to competitive pressures by container carriers and will thus be, in
general, lower than p1 (the demand function is not changed).
Some remarks are in order concerning this analysis. The marginal cost curve
becomes almost vertical when terminal capacity is not sufficient anymore to
handle all containers. More containers can be handled only when capacity is
expanded and all other measures to increase terminal productivity have been
taken (eg longer port and terminal operating hours, more cranes, higher
employment, etc.). Furthermore, pricing will be affected by strategies of other
competing ports. However, as mentioned above, there has been a convergence of
interest between the private operators and their port authorities, united in their
effort to compete against other ports (Farrell, 1999). The economies of scale
available to established operators puts them in a strong competitive position.
From the above it becomes clear that although terminal operations can be
profitable business forprivate investors, the roleof port authorities in this should not
be underestimated. Differences in financial performance are not simply a question of
some operators in Europe being more efficient than others, but are strongly
influenced by government policy towards container terminal investment funding.
Current practice in terminal investments in Europe
Tables 2 and 3 present a number of cases in the Netherlands, extended with some
information on container terminals in other European countries, in order to
analyse Public Private Partnerships in practice. This overview gives some insight
into the level of financial involvement of governmental bodies regarding container
terminal investments. It seems that more public involvement leads to improved
financial performance of the operator. In this context, it is important that a
terminal is supposed to be efficient if it produces maximum output (container
traffic in TEU) for given inputs (Notteboom et al., 2000). This means that next to
the investment picture also the operational performance is important. The tables
are restricted to the main core variables of investments in container terminals.
We observe that the total investment amount varies between 860 million and
4.6 million Euros. Terminal capacities are varying between 15,000 and
3,500,000 TEU a year, in these cases. Almost all terminals are either barge oriented
or deep-sea oriented. Initial investment costs vary between 135 – 465 Euros per TEU.
As can be seen in Table 3, the Public-Private ratio varies between 23 – 77 for
the container terminal in Beverwijk and 75 – 25 for the Ceres Paragon Marine
Terminal in Amsterdam. Almost all container terminals are Public Private
Partnerships where the government contributes considerable amounts to their
financing. Governmental involvement is rather high and several initiatives
suggest that this is growing. Authorities want to be involved, because they believe
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that economic benefits are connected to this activity (terminal operation and
investment).
Three terminal case studies and Public Private Partnership
Three cases were selected in order to look in more detail into investment
components and the differences among the development of a new container
terminal (Ceres, Amsterdam), the redevelopment of an existing site (Shell Haven,
London), and the extension of an existing container terminal (Port of Felixstowe,
Felixstowe).
Table 2: Planned container terminal investment in Europe (1999 – 2001)
Terminal Name Location
Investment
(E)
Capacity
(TEU/year)
Main
customers
Transport
mode
Investment
per TEU (E)
Ceres Paragon Marine
Terminal (NT) Amsterdam 172 mln 950,000 – Deepsea 180
Oosterhout (NT) Oosterhout – 025,000 Ikea Barge –
Alphen aan de Rijn
(NT) Alphen 22.5 mln – Heineken Barge –
IMCA (R) Amsterdam 22.5 mln 150,000 – Deepsea 150
WCT (NT) Vlissingen 550 mln 2,500,000 – Deepsea 220
Valburg (NT) Nijmegen 550 mln 1,400,000 – Barge/rail 415
Zeeland Container
Terminal (NT) Terneuzen 31 mln 100,000 Dow Deepsea 310
Beverwijk (NT) Beverwijk 6 mln 40,000 Corus, Cargill Barge 150
Container Terminal
regio Twente (NT) Hengelo 4.6 mln 22,500
Grolsch
Vredestein Barge 205
Wanssum (NT) Wanssum 10 mln – – Barge –
Container terminal
Zutphen (NT) Zutphen 7 mln 15,000 Addink/Opijnen Barge 465
Moerdijk Container
Terminal (E) Moerdijk 20 mln 150,000 – Deepsea 135
Euromax Container
Terminal (NT) Rotterdam 525 mln 1,700,000 P&O Nedlloyd Deepsea 310
Shell Haven (R) London 835 mln 300,000 – Deepsea 240
Trinity Container
Terminal (E) Felixstowe 114 mln 500,000 – Deepsea 230
Container Terminal
Deurne (NT) Deurne 4.9 mln –
Gosselin
Moving Barge –
CTIV (NT) Bremen 260 mln – – Deepsea –
Containerterminal
Duinkerken (E) Duinkerken 15 mln – – Deepsea –
Harwich Container
Terminal (E) Harwich 160 mln 1,700,000 – Deepsea 95
Southampton CT (NT) Southampton 860 mln – – Deepsea –
River Terminal
Wielsbeke (NT) Wielsbeke 5 mln 75,000 – Barge 70
Average – 208 mln 912,000 – – 225
Container terminal development plan: NT=New Terminal, E=Extension, R=Redevelopment.
Sources: Journal of Commerce, Cargoweb Newsletter, Annual Report of ECT and HHLG, and Nieuwsblad
Transport, 1999 and 2000 (figures in million Euros)
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Ceres Paragon Marine Terminal Amsterdam
The terminal in Amsterdam is a joint project of Ceres Terminals Inc and the Port
Management of Amsterdam. Total investment is estimated at 172 million Euros
and the terminal was fully operational in July 2001. Total extra employment is
estimated at 600 persons. Ceres Terminals Inc has invested 43.5 million Euros
(terminal buildings) and the Amsterdam Port Authority another 128.5 million
Euros in infrastructure and part of the cranes (Ceres, 1998). A contract for all
construction activities (such as berth dock, quay walls, paving, lightning, fencing,
drainage, electrical systems, and other subsoil infrastructure; rail terminal and
crane rails) was awarded for 41 million Euros.
Port of Felixstowe (United Kingdom)
The container terminal in Felixstowe is a joint project of Hutchison Whampoa
and the Port Management of Felixstowe. The current terminal consists of 540
acres and an additional 250 acres, for which a long term lease has been granted.
The expansion plan has a two year time path and will add about 500,000 TEU in
Table 3: Terminal investments in Europe and public-private partnerships (1999 – 2001)
Terminal Name
Investment
amount (E)
Public
Investment
Private
Investment
Capacity
(TEU)
Public-Private
Partnership
ratio (%)
Ceres Paragon Marine Terminal 172 mln 128.5 mln 43.5 mln 950,000 75 – 25
Oosterhout – – – 25,000 –
Alphen aan de Rijn 22.5 mln – – – –
IMCA 22.5 mln – – 150,000 –
WCT 550 mln – – 2,500,000 –
Valburg 550 mln – – 1,400,000 –
Zeeland Container Terminal 31 mln 17 mln 14 mln 75,000 55 – 45
Beverwijk 6 mln 1.4 mln 4.6 mln – 23 – 77
Container Terminal regio Twente 4.6 mln 2.8 mln 1.8 mln 22,500 60 – 40
Wanssum 10 mln – – – –
Container terminal Zutphen 7 mln – – 15,000 –
Moerdijk Container Terminal 20 mln – – 150,000 –
Euromax Container Terminal 525 mln 300 mln 225 mln 1,700,000 57 – 43
Shell Haven 835 mln – – 3,000,000 –
Trinity Container Terminal 114 mln – – 500,000 –
Container Terminal Deurne 4.9 mln – – – –
CTIV 260 mln – – – –
Containerterminal Duinkerken 15 mln 9 mln 6 mln – 60 – 40
River Terminal Wielsbeke (NT) 5 mln 2.4 mln 2.6 mln 75,000 48 – 52
Harwich Container Terminal – – – 1,700,000 –
Southampton CT 860 mln – – – –
Average 208 mln 66 mln 43 mln 912,000 55 – 45
NT=New Terminal, E=Extension, R=Redevelopment.
Sources: Journal of Commerce, Cargoweb Newsletter, Annual Reports ECT and HHLG, and Nieuwsblad
Transport (1999 and 2000)
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extra container handling capacity. Total investment is estimated at 114 million
Euros. The expansion plan includes a quay extension of 270 metres and an
additional 25 acres. The extra quay will be capable of serving two extra
container ships. The three extra cranes are capable of serving ships up to 20
containers – and maybe even 22 – wide on deck. Cargo handling equipment is
included in the investment amount. The current terminal is studying the
possibility of adding cargo handling equipment worth 34 million Euros as well.
This amount will probably be paid for two quay cranes and 10 rubber-tyre
gantry cranes. The 26 km long approach channel has just been dredged to a
depth of 15 metres (high tide). Dredging costs were in the order of 46 million
Euros.
P&O Shell Haven Container Terminal (Thurrock, Essex)
P&O and Shell will redevelop this former refinery site into a container port of 3.5
million TEUs when fully developed. The site will consist of 1,500 acres of land,
3,000 m of quays providing berths for up to 10 vessels. The surrounding area will
be developed to provide services such as transport and logistics. P&O will
purchase the land required and the site will be jointly developed with Shell. The
Port of London Authority and Thurrock Council form part of the proposed deal to
develop the site. Currently, the site is well connected by road and rail to the UK
national network, but the capacity of these connections is planned to increase
further. Total investment is thought to exceed 835 million Euros over the next
10 – 15 years. The terminal will be built in stages and the first phase – ready in
2003 or 2004 – will cost around 167 million Euros.
Taking a closer look at the different container terminal development models,
one comes to Table 4. The table shows the relation between container terminal
development types and risks of investments in infrastructure.
In all three cases, one observes that the private terminal operator runs the
commercial and the operational risk. Financial and construction risks are shared
in all three cases. In the case of a completely new terminal, one can see that the
government runs most of the political risk, whereas in the case of an extension of
a container terminal (eg Felixstowe) the political risk is shared. In the case of the
Table 4: Container terminal types and characteristics of investments in infrastructure
Amsterdam Felixstowe Thurrock, Essex
Political risk G G/P None
Financial risk G/P G/P G/P
Construction risk G/P G/P G/P
Operational risk P P P
Commercial risk P P P
G=government, P=private party; in this case the terminal operator.
Source: Wiegmans et al. (1999)
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redevelopment of an existing site (a former oil refinery in the case of London), the
political risk is of far less importance, since all parties are eager to transform such
a site into a more productive area.
CONCLUSION
The institutional arrangements of financing ports and maritime infrastructure in
Europe vary considerably, reflecting the considerable differences in their
ownership and organisational structures. The management of ports often depends
on public authorities and is subject to different degrees of regulation. Port
infrastructure has long been regarded as a pure public good regulated and
financed by the government. But it appears that there is recently a distinct trend
towards greater private participation in port activities. Financing of particular port
facilities (particularly those with a predominantly commercial nature) is
increasingly becoming the responsibility of the private sector, while the
government (or public port authority) tends to restrict itself more and more to
its landlord role.
However, fully privatised port activities are rarely identified, as it is still not
attractive to private investors to invest in terminal infrastructure without
government involvement. This is mainly due to some specific risks caused by
several characteristics (public good) of transport infrastructure. In analysing
investment projects of container terminals, in Europe in particular, we found that
in all projects both the government and private parties play a role. In general,
container terminals are an example of a successful cooperation between
government and business.
So, it seems beneficiary for both parties to be involved in financing port
infrastructure. Possible explanations for the involvement of governments include
the creation of regional or national employment and the fact that infrastructure is
still considered as being government core business. However, the main reason
appears to be competition with other ports. Most ports are still receiving large
amounts of public funding, making it very difficult for other ports to be
competitive without governmental support. Nevertheless, it is important to note
that ports have been more successful than other modes of transport in attracting
private capital. Reasons for this include the distinction between infrastructure and
services (making operation of terminals profitable), labour productivity gains in
recent years and the steady fall in unit costs, the relatively low risks due to the
willingness of governments to bear political, financial and construction risks and
the light regulatory framework. It can be concluded from this that the high private
involvement in port infrastructure investment is mainly due to support by public
bodies making risks acceptable.
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Although it is generally questionable whether infrastructure can be entirely
subject to market forces, for particular facilities there is certainly a clear scope,
and ports offer a good example; they are rapidly becoming a normal market-
based industry through the injection of private money that ensures greater
competition, higher productivity and probably lower costs. Container terminals
in particular represent more and more normal business. The chance for normal
profits seems to be higher in investments in container terminals than in
conventional investments in infrastructure. A fully competitive market for
terminals is in the long-run not unrealistic. An obstacle to this trend is posed by
the main reason of governmental involvement: As long as some governments
subsidise port activities, there is a case of unfair competition; then, it is difficult
for others to follow a different policy of reducing subsidies. In order to deal with
this effectively, it is plausible that coordination on a European level may be
necessary. As current EU policy is aimed at fair competition without distorting
market regulation, it is likely to expect that the EU will discourage financial
involvement of (local) public authorities in the port sector. This means that,
despite the risks, existing terminal subsidies will be reduced and new container
terminals will be built to the maximum extent possible without taxpayer’s
money.
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